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I 
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The parties to this Appeal are the Plaintiff/Appellee Woods 
Cross, a municipal corporation, and the Defendant/Appellant Craig 
Kirk. 
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V 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Craig Kirk objects to the Woods Cross' Statement of facts, 
paragraphs 1-19, for the reason that the alleged "Statement of 
Facts does not comply with the provisions of Rule 24 (a)(7), 
24(e) and 11(b) in that the alleged Statement of Facts does not 
cite to the pages of the original record as required. 
Furthermore, Mr. Kirk objects to paragraphs 18 through 27 of 
Woods Cross' Brief for the reason that the alleged items referred 
to in those paragraphs are not a part of the record for this 
matter and, therefore, are not properly a part of this appeal 
proceeding. 
VI 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BOTH AS A MATTER OF FACT AND AS A MATTER 
OF LAW WHEN IT GRANTED WOODS CROSS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF FACT AND LAW IN 
GRANTING WOODS CROSS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR A PERMANENT INJUNCTION. 
Woods Cross asserts that it is undisputed that Craig Kirk 
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owns property located at approximately 1450 West 500 South, Woods 
Cross, Utah. What is approximately? One block? Two blocks? 
One mile? Two miles? 
It is, however, an undisputed fact that Craig Kirk does not 
own the property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross, 
Utah, and that 1450 West 500 South is on the opposite side of the 
street from the property Mr. Kirk owns on West 500 South, Woods 
Cross. To which wrong piece of property does the trial court's 
order apply? 
Woods Cross asks this Court to rule that Mr. Kirk owns the 
property located at 1450 West 500 South Woods Cross, Utah because 
someone obtaining a building permit put the address 1450 West 500 
South on the building permit. Woods Cross claims that person was 
Mr. Kirk's agent. However, there is no evidence in the record 
showing that any such person was Mr. Kirk's "agent," or that Mr. 
Kirk authorized the use of any specific address. Furthermore, 
Mr. Kirk was not the owner of the property at the time the 
structure was built the property was owned jointly by a number of 
individuals. However, even assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Kirk 
owned the property at the time the structure was built, and even 
assuming, arguendo, that the person who filled out the building 
permit application was Mr. Kirk's agent, those facts still do not 
make Mr. Kirk's property the property located at 1450 South 500 
West, Woods Cross, Utah. 
Woods Cross asserts that the trial court's order does not 
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specify 1450 South 500 West but rather simply refers to "property 
which is located on the south side of 500 South and west of 1400 
West" and therefore the trial court's Judgment is sufficiently 
descriptive. If Mr. Kirk exchanges some of the property he owns 
on the south side of 500 South for other property on the south 
side of 500 south, does the trial court's order apply to that 
property as well? Is the trial court's order an order designed 
to enforce a "zoning ordinance" against a certain piece of 
property or is it an order directed at Mr. Kirk personally. If 
Mr. Kirk exchanges some of the property he owns on the south side 
of 500 South for property on the north side of 500 South will he 
still be subject to the trial court's order. That property may 
then actually be located at 1450 West 500 South. Is Woods Cross 
enforcing a zoning ordinance or harassing Mr. Kirk who is doing 
nothing different from nearly all other owners of property along 
500 South? 
Woods Cross asserts that the trial court found that property 
at issue was properly identified. Where is that statement found 
in the record? Woods Cross says that Judge Johnson specifically 
asked Mr. Kirk's attorney if Kirk owned property in the area to 
which the pleading refereed and that Mr. Kirk's attorney answered 
in the affirmative. Where are those statements in the record? 
Woods Cross further asserts that Judge Johnson explained that he 
did not want any misunderstanding or issue regarding the property 
that was the subject of the case and that Mr. Kirk's attorney 
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agreed thereby consent i ir m I Ill I . I In P III ^>> I M I I u : o p e i I y l i n e 
case involves and that such property is zoned A-» 1 and that the 
property is being used for parking storing of large vehicles 
and equipment W!,,|i • ,i "in Hi HUSH s,
 M - •'• in I he rprunl? 
Woods Cross x.o asking this Court take as fact assertions 
that do not appear any where in the record rhese statements are 
p a r t i - . i l H I II I, i n t n r P t t H m i i I In i i n mi id II hum me1) w\\ i 
present at the hearing. Mr. Kirk and his counsel, who was 
present at tr.t .earing, specifically dispute those assertions. 
Contr t 
specifically disputes that he is the owner of the property 
located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross, Utah and 
speci- i 
oi - ~-i~, Cross City zoning ordinances. Mr. Kirk's affidavit and 
the other documentation filed with the trial court legally 
" ^ u f r 1 1 " 1 1 * 1 1 mi in ! I I ii 11 p i in iii in in i> i 11 1 » ^, • 11111ii1111 ii mi I in (i)i«M 11 „ t 
takes only one sworn statement dispute averments on the other 
side of a controversy and create - ^  of fact, precluding 
summary judgmenl Holbrook *, Adams 
L97 5) , 
However, even if the trial court did make the statements 
w i l l Ii i R s p p c t I I II in1 [ n i > | K » r l | i II 1 eqfc'nl II 11 M l i n u i i f | il l i n 
legally improper and impermissible for the trial court to make 
such determination motion for Summary Judgmen" motion 
summar a -.gh 
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disputed evidence the court is simply to determine if there are 
issues of fact to be decided. W. M. Barnes Co. V. Sohio Natural 
Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981); Spor v. Crested Butte 
Silver Mining, Inc., 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1987). On summary 
judgment motion a court may only consider facts that are not in 
dispute. Sorenson v. Beers, 585 P.2d 827 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
A court may not consider the weight of testimony or credibility 
of a witness on a motion for summary judgment. The court simply 
determines that there are no issues of material fact and that one 
party is entitled summary judgment as a matter of law. Singleton 
v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 (1967); Sandberg v. 
Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1987). 
In the instant matter the trial court clearly chose to 
accept the assertions contained in Woods Cross1 statement of 
facts and the affidavits it filed in support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment and to ignore the affidavit filed by Mr. Kirk 
and the documents filed in support of his Memorandum in 
Opposition to Woods Cross1 Motion for Summary Judgment. That 
decision was improper and constituted prejudicial and reversible 
error. 
Woods Cross next asserts that Mr. Kirk's affidavit saying 
that he is not conducting any business on the property located at 
1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross is a specious argument because 
Mr. Kirk claims that he does not own the property located at 1450 
West 500 South, Woods Cross. Woods Cross asserts that Mr. Kirk's 
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affidavit does not create an issue 
specified I I ] ' assert that is not conducting business on any of the 
property that he does - along 500 South n Woods Cross, Woods 
Cross asks this Court Ignore t I r 
acciibeiJ i conducting business on any ut I lie property that he 
owns along 500 South in Woods Cross. If Woods Cross had asserted 
that Mr Kirk was cond iujc« ,1V?,,.;.;• j( i \w | ujpwrty that 
he i\ ..'lually owns, Mr, Kirk would have filed an affidavit 
asserting that he is not conducting any such business. However, 
M i™. Kirk cannot be expected 
assei ted. The only thing specious ;L ise is Woods Cross' 
violation of Mr. Kirk's rights and Woods Cross' immoral 
prosecution of this case. 
in ii iiiutjon tor summary judgment the adverse party I s 
entitled to have the court survey the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences fairly drawn therpfmi i m m i m » i 11 miim I mi favorable to 
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Thompson 
v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 3 ^  *» * ?•< " {:c^v * Morris v. 
Farnsworth Motel, l^j i • , In ruling 
mot inn for summary judgment, the court may only consider 
facts that are not in dispute. Sorenson v. Beers, supra. The 
trial court violated the standard g 
hi mi I ijninpi i in ii'i mi prejudicial and reversible error in granting 
Woods Cross' Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, the grant 
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of Summary Judgment entered in favor of Woods Cross must be 
reversed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT WOODS CROSS WAS 
ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
In order for Woods Cross to prevail on its Motion for 
Summary Judgment at the trial court level, Woods Cross had to 
demonstrate that: 1) there were no issues of material fact 
present in this matter which precluded the trial court from 
granting Summary Judgment in favor of Woods Cross, and 
2) that Woods Cross was entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter 
of law. As established in by Appellant's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment, genuine 
issues of material fact are present which preclude the trial 
court from granting Woods Cross' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Furthermore, Woods Cross did not, and could not, establish that 
it was entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law. 
It is an indisputable principal of law that on a summary 
judgment motion, the trial court must review the facts and law in 
the light most favorable to the party against whom Summary 
Judgment is sought. See Judkins v. Toone, 27, Utah 2d 17, 492 
P.2d 980 (1972). A summary judgment must be supported by 
evidence, admissions and inferences which, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the loser, show that "there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law" such showing 
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must preclude all reasonable pos? 
given a trial, produce evidence which reasonably sustaini a 
judgment in his favor. Bullock v. Desert Dodge Truck Ctr., Inc.F 
xx utah ^u x I lierel t II'H , IM-HMUHP Mom IS 
Cross did not cannot, demonstrate that Mr. Kirk has engaged 
in any prohibited activity, the property located at 1450 West 
500 South, Woods Cross 
to Summary Judgment as a matter of there is 
genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment is proper only 
it ti Leadino \ 
party ..... entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Lockhart v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 678 (Utah 1982). 
i: "1 '? :: • :: • is Cr oss 
entitled to a permanent injunction against Mr. Kirk, Woods Cross 
must first establish that Mr. Kirk has engaged in some prohibited 
a i *t i in s i n i1!in I I Il ill j i in i n "i I  
Mr. Kirk is engaging any such prohibited activities on the 
property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah. 
even if committed by Mr. Kirk, are a violation of the Woods Cross 
City zoning ordinances. Therefore, Woods Cross did not establish 
I , "I i .a I , "i 111! ill • :s p! i in Il , "i 1 ] e dl 1 , < i ! :! i ii m "in i :i i « Il 1i i c i n i e I \ I -i i, \ i i i - ' I I < ' ' i i I - i; '" I " "I t ! * 
trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error when it 
granted Woods Cross1 Motion fo; Summary Judgment Consequently, 
in t»""'\ e r s t - Il i i ' i i i i l in i H i n i d i .Hi; i , l . .' .' 
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POINT in 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING WOODS 
CROSS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MR. KIRK'S 
COUNTERCLAIM AND/OR AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES. 
Woods Cross asserts that it was proper for the trial court 
to grant Summary Judgment on Mr. Kirkfs affirmative defenses and 
Counterclaim for the reason that Mr. Kirk had not exhausted his 
administrative remedies. Woods Cross cites this Court to two 
cases and to the Utah Code wherein it is stated that a person 
must exhaust his administrative remedies before he challenges 
land use decisions in the district court. Neither of the cases 
cited by Woods Cross, nor the provision of the Utah Code, are 
applicable in this situation. 
In the instant matter, Mr. Kirk did not seek judicial 
relief. Mr. Kirk was sued by Woods Cross. Mr. Kirk did not file 
a complaint asking the trial court to rule that Woods Cross1 
capricious and arbitrary land use decisions were invalid. Mr. 
Kirk simply responded to a law suit filed against him. 
Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(hereinafter, Rule 12") states that a party to a law suit waives 
all defenses not presented by motion or in his answer. Mr. Kirk 
as a defendant in this law suit had the obligation to raise all 
affirmative defenses in either his Answer or in his Counterclaim, 
or he would have been barred from ever raising those defenses. 
See Tvcresen v. Magna Water Co.. 13 Utah 2d 397, 375 P.2d 456 
12 
(1962); Bezner v, Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898 
(Utah 1976). 
Woods Cross is asking this Court to put Mr. Kirk in a no win 
situation. Woods Cross files a complaint against Mr. Kirk and 
then asserts that Mr. Kirk cannot raise any defenses because he 
has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Mr. Kirk 
cannot exhaust his administrative remedies because Woods Cross 
has filed a complaint and then a summary judgment motion, which 
is granted before Mr. Kirk can exhaust his administrative 
remedies. 
Mr. Kirk must assert his affirmative defenses and file his 
compulsory counterclaim or be forever barred from asserting those 
defenses and filing the counterclaim; yet, Woods Cross asserts he 
cannot raise any affirmative defenses or file a counterclaim 
because Mr. Kirk has not exhausted his administrative remedies. 
If this Court buys into Woods Cross1 argument, Woods Cross can 
preclude Mr. Kirk from ever obtaining due process. 
If Mr. Kirk had filed this action, Woods Cross1 argument 
would be a valid argument. If Woods Cross had served Mr. Kirk 
with cease and desist orders which Mr. Kirk had ignored, Woods 
Cross1 argument would make more sense. If Woods Cross had given 
Mr. Kirk written notice that he was allegedly violating Woods 
Cross zoning ordinances and given him instructions to comply with 
Woods Cross1 zoning ordinances or follow the appropriate 
administrative remedies to challenge the zoning ordinances and 
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their alleged violation, Woods Cross1 argument would be valid. 
However, the record does not even remotely imply that any such 
actions took place. 
Woods Cross simply filed a complaint against Mr. Kirk, moved 
for summary judgment and said to the trial court, and now to this 
Court, that Rule 12 be dammed, Mr. Kirk cannot raise any 
affirmative defenses or file a counterclaim because he has not 
exhausted his administrative remedies. Precluding Mr. Kirk from 
raising affirmative defenses and filing a compulsory counterclaim 
in a case in which he is a defendant is a per se violation of Mr. 
Kirk's due process rights. Therefore, the trial court committed 
prejudicial and reversible error when it granted Woods Cross' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and the trial court's decision must 
be reversed and remanded. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN RULING ON 
APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE MR. KIRK HAD 
THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY AND SUBMIT EVIDENCE ON 
HIS COUNTERCLAIM AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES. 
Woods Cross does not d i spute Mr. Kirk's a s s e r t i o n that i t i s 
improper t o entry summary judgment before d iscovery i s 
incomplete. Woods Cross, however, a s s e r t s that Mr. Kirk i s 
estopped t o r a i s e t h i s point of law on appeal, arguing tha t i t i s 
an i s s u e ra i sed for the f i r s t time on appeal. 
Woods Cross a l s o does not d ispute Mr. Kirk's a s s e r t i o n that 
he never had the opportunity t o conduct any discovery or tha t Mr. 
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Kirk is entitled to conduct discovery or that discovery should be 
liberally permitted. Woods Cross simply asserts that Mr. Kirk is 
estopped from raising the discovery issue on appeal. 
Mr. Kirk admits that issues may not be raised for the first 
time on appeal. However, Mr. Kirk is not raising discovery as an 
issue on appeal. Mr. Kirk is simply stating a legal precedent to 
demonstrate that Woods Cross was not entitled to summary judgment 
as a matter of law. 
If Mr. Kirk had had a trial in the lower court and failed to 
raise the issue of discovery, admittedly, he could not raise that 
claim on appeal for the first time. However, in this matter, Mr. 
Kirk was not given a trial and the trial court ruled that there 
were no issues of fact and that Woods Cross was entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, Mr. is not 
estopped from raising any legal argument to demonstrate that 
Woods Cross was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 
law. Therefore, the trial court committed prejudicial and 
reversible error when it granted Woods Cross1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and the trial court's decision must be reversed and 
remanded. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING WOODS 
CROSS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITHOUT FIRST RULING ON 
MR. KIRK'S MOTION TO DISMISS APPELLEE'S COMPLAINT AND WITHOUT 
FIRST RULING ON APPELLANTS MOTIONS TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVITS 
SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
Woods Cross asserts that because its counsel prepared a 
15 
judgment that stated "Defendant's counterclaim in its entirety is 
dismissed" and "Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Motions to Strike 
Affidavits, and Motion to Stay Proceedings are denied," that the 
Judgment establishes as a matter of fact that the trial court 
entertained argument on those motions. Again Ms. Romney, who 
wasn't at the hearing, testifies as to what transpired at the 
hearing. She asserts that both parties addressed these motions 
at oral argument. Once again, where is the record to support 
that assertion. If Mr. Kirk's assertion that the motions were 
never entertained on oral argument is false, then the record will 
show that the motions were argued. Mr. Kirk, however, cannot 
prove a negative, i.e., that the motions were never argued or 
addressed by the trial court. Woods Cross, however, can prove 
that oral argument was had on the motions, if any such argument 
had take place. 
Woods Cross has failed to do so because it cannot do so. 
The self serving Judgment prepared by Woods Cross' counsel which 
was never reviewed or approved by Mr. Kirk's counsel prior to 
signing by Judge Johnson does not establish that any oral 
argument was ever entertained on Mr. Kirk's Motion. Nor does the 
Judgment establish that the trial court ever considered the 
Motions. All the Judgment proves is that Judge Johnson signed a 
judgment that Mr. Kirk's counsel did not approve as to form. 
Woods Cross' Summary Judgment Motion was based on the 
affidavits of Brent Stephenson, Gayle Stephenson, Leslie Gertsch, 
16 
Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens. Those affidavits were a 
principal part of Woods Cross' Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
Affidavits allegedly established Mr. Kirk's violations complained 
of in Appellee's Complaint. 
The Affidavits of Brent Stephenson, Gayle Stephenson, Leslie 
Gertsch, Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens were based on hearsay, 
speculation, conclusion, and opinion, and therefore, were not 
admissible under the provisions of Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Hearsay and opinion testimony that would not 
be admissible if testified to at the trial may not properly be 
set forth in an affidavit supporting a motion for summary 
judgment. Walker v. Rockey Mt. Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274, 
508 P.2d 538 (1973); Western States Thrift & Loan Co. v. 
Blpmguist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1972). The hearsay 
affidavits should not have been allowed. Therefore, the trial 
court committed prejudicial and reversible error when it failed 
to consider or rule on Mr. Kirk's Motions to Strike the 
Affidavits of Brent Stephenson, Gayle Stephenson, Leslie Gertsch, 
Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens prior to granting Woods Cross' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Because the trial court committed 
prejudicial and reversible error in failing to rule on 
Appellant's Motions to Strike the Affidavits of Brent Stephenson, 
Gayle Stephenson, Leslie Gertsch, Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens 
prior to granting Woods Cross' Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
trial court's decision must be reversed and remanded. 
17 
POINT VI 
(MR. KIRK'S APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS) 
Mr. Kirk's appeal is based on hard facts and well-
established law, and it supported by the record. There is 
nothing frivolous about it. If Mr. Kirk's Appeal were frivolous, 
this Court would have granted Woods Cross1 Motion for Summary 
Disposition. What is frivolous is Woods Cross1 asking this Court 
for sanctions under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
vn 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The trial court committed reversible and prejudicial error 
when it granted Woods Cross1 Motion for Summary Judgement. 
Therefore, the trial court's grant of Summary Judgment must be 
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings• 
WHEREFORE, Mr. Kirk respectfully request that the Summary 
Judgment entered by the trial court be reversed and this matter 
be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this c / ' day of August 1994. 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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I hereby certify that on the s day of August 1994, I 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief to the 
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United States Mail, postage prepaid. 
Michael Z. Hayes 
MAZURAN & HAYES P.C. 
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Char 1 ear A. Schultz 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(h) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(e) 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 11(b) 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24 (a)(7) 
Utah Rules or Appellate Procedure Rule 24(e) 
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raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the 
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this 
rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which 
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has 
made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join 
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a 
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion 
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court 
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The 
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in 
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading 
after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be 
deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an 
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may 
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges 
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determina-
tion by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the 
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for 
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. 
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the 
United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the 
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court 
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment inserted "and complaint" in the first sen-
tence. 
ANALYSIS 
Jurisdiction over the person. 
Motion for judgment on pleadings. 
—Matters outside of pleadings. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Rights of opposing party. 
Motion for more definite statement. 
—Bill of particulars. 
—Criteria. 
—Motion to dismiss distinguished. 
—Purpose. 
Delay. 
Obtaining evidence. 
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
—Explained. 
—Improper. 
—Standard. 
—Standard of review. 
Motion to dismiss for lack of venue. 
—Forum-selection clause in contract. 
Presentation of defenses. 
—How presented. 
Affirmative defenses. 
Divorce. 
Election of remedies. 
Failure to state claim upon which relief 
can be granted. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rule 12, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Motions generally, 
U.R.C.P. 7. 
• General and special appearances. 
Statute of frauds. 
Venue. 
—When presented. 
Amended answer. 
Security for costs of nonresident plaintiff. 
—Failure to file. 
Summary judgment. 
—Conversion of motion to dismiss. 
—Court's discretion. 
—Court's initiative. 
—Defenses. 
—Opportunity to present pertinent material. 
—Preclusion. 
Issues of fact. 
Waiver of defenses. 
—Defect of parties. 
—Defective service of process. 
—Exceptions. 
Subject matter jurisdiction. 
When issues raised. 
—Failure to join indispensable party. 
—Failure to pay consideration. 
—Mutual mistake. 
—Statute of frauds. 
—Statute of limitations. 
—Waiver. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 148 
scheduled appearance in another court on that from the date of notice of entry of such judg-
date, but due to fact that there were no law or ment, rather than from the date of judgment 
motion days between time objection was filed Buckner v Main Realty & Ins. Co , 4 Utah 2d 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re- 124, 288 P 2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank 
fusal to set aside default judgment entered & Trust Co v Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d)) 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion Griffiths v Ham- C i t e d m U t a h S a n d & Gravel Prods. Corp. v 
mon, 560 P 2d 1375 (Utah 1977). Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P 2d 703 (1965), 
Time for appeal. J P W E n t e r s • I n c v Naef> 6 0 4 P 2 d 4 8 6 
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal ( U t a h 1979)> K a t z v P l e r c e> 7 3 2 P 2 d 9 2 ( U t a h 
from a default judgment in a city court ran 1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason- Opening default or default judgment claimed 
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for to have been obtained because of attorney's 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah Gra- mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
ham v Sawaya, 1981 B.YU L. Rev 937.
 t n a l o r f l h n g o f necessary papers, 21 A L R.3d 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am Jur 2d Judgments ^255 
H C . j l - 49 C J S Judgments <* 187 to 218. , F * l l u r * t o g ' v e
 k
n o t l c e
 °/ a P P h c a t l 0 n *>r d f 
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to ha- fault J ^ 1 ^ ^ e ™ ™*l0c* 1S r e q u i r e d 0 n l y 
bihty against defaulting defendant, 8 A L R 3d b v custom, 28 A L R 3d 1383. 
1070 Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- pretrial conference, 55 A L.R.3d 303. 
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A L.R.3d Default judgments against the United States 
1272. under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Procedure, 55 A.LR. Fed. 190. 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam- Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 92 to 134. 
ages, 15 A.L.R 3d 586. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
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forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affidavit. 
—Contents. 
—Corporation. 
'—Experts. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Objection. 
—Sufficiency. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. 
—Superseding pleadings. 
—Unpleaded defenses. 
—Verified pleading. 
—Waiver of right to contest. 
—When unavailable. 
Exclusive control of facts. 
—Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
—Standard of review. 
Attorney's fees. 
Availability of motion. 
Compliance with rule. 
Cross-motions. 
Damages. 
Discovery. 
Disputed facts. 
Evidence 
—Facts considered. 
^—Improper evidence. 
—Proof. 
—Weight of testimony. 
Implicit rulings. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
—Notice. 
—Corporate existence. 
—Deeds. 
—Lease as security. 
Judicial attitude. 
Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
—Provision not jurisdictional. 
—Waiver of defect. 
Procedural due process. 
Purpose. 
Scope. 
Summary judgment improper. 
—Damage to insured vehicle. 
—Dispersal of interest. 
—Findings by court. 
—Foreclosure of trust deeds. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Guardianship. 
—Mortgage note. 
—Negligence. 
—Nonspecific denial of requests for admission. 
—Note. 
—Recovery for goods and services. 
—Stock ownership. *' 
—Wrongful possession. 
Summary judgment proper. 
—Contract action. 
—Contract terms. 
—Deceit. 
—Jurisdiction. 
—Negligence. 
Rule 11 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 392 
(f) Deferral of ruling. As to any issue raised by a motion for summary 
disposition, the court may defer its ruling until plenary presentation and 
consideration of the case. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS ments and authorities. An appellate court's re-
~ , , __ jection of appellant's contentions as unmerito-
Dismissal by court.
 r i o u g d o e s n o t d e n y h i m h i s h t o f a p p e a , 
Summary affirmance. Hernandez v. Hayward, 764 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct. 
lime tor tiling.
 A p p 1 9 8 8 ) ; S t a t e y P a l m e i % 7 8 6 P 2<* 248 C l t e d
* (Utah Ct. App. I9i;0) decided under former 
Dismissal by court. Rule 10, Utah R. Ct. App.). 
Appeal appropriate for summary disposition Time for filing. 
(i.e., dismissal) on court's own motion. See A motion for summary disposition that is 
Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. clearly meritorious supports a suspension of 
App. 1987). the time limitation contained in this rule. 
Summary affirmance. B a i l e y v- Adams, 798 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 
Summary affirmance under this rule is a de- 1990). 
termination of the appeal on its merits, after Cited in Benchmark, Inc. v. Salt Lake 
the parties have been afforded a full and ade- Valley Mental Health Bd., Inc., 830 P.2d 218 
quate opportunity to present relevant argu- (Utah 1991). 
Rule 11. The record on appeal. 
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and ex-
hibits filed in the trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index 
prepared by the clerk of the trial court, and where available the docket sheet, 
shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases. A copy of the record certified 
by the clerk of the trial court to conform to the original may be substituted for 
the original as the record on appeal. Only those papers prescribed under 
paragraph (d) of this rule shall be transmitted to the appellate court. 
(b) Pagination and indexing of record. Immediately upon filing of the 
notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial court shall paginate all of the original 
papers and any transcript filed in that court in chronological order and shall 
prepare a chronological index'of those papers. The index shall contain a refer-
ence to the date on which the paper was filed in the trial court and the 
starting page of the record on which the paper will be found. Clerks of the 
trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and procedures for checking 
out the record after pagination for use by the parties in preparing briefs for an 
appeal or in preparing or briefing a petition for writ of certiorari. 
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in 
the event that more than one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply 
with the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any 
other action necessary to enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and 
transmit the record. A single record shall be transmitted. 
(d) Papers on appeal. 
(1) Criminal cases. All of the papers in a criminal case shall be in-
cluded by the clerk of the trial court as part of the record on appeal. 
(2) Civil cases. In all civil cases, the papers to be transmitted shall 
consist of the following. 
(A) Civil cases with short records. In civil cases where all the 
papers total fewer than 300 pages, all of the papers will be transmit-
ted to the appellate court upon completion of the filing of briefs. In 
such cases, the appellant shall serve upon the clerk of the trial court, 
simultaneously with the filing of appellant's reply brief, notice of the 
date on which appellant's reply brief was filed. If appellant does not 
intend to file a reply brief, appellant shall notify the clerk of the trial 
court of that fact within 30 days of the filing of appellee's brief. 
(B) All other civil cases. In all other civil cases where the papers 
are or exceed 300 pages, all parties shall file with the clerk of the 
trial court, within 10 days after briefing is completed, a joint or sepa-
Rule 24 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 408 
same standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals. 
(Added effective October 1, 1992.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Allegation of facts required. to remand a claim under this rule for a fishing 
Because defendant did not allege any facts in expedition. State v. Garrett, 849 P 2d 578 
support of his ineffective assistance claim, the (Utah Ct App.), cert, denied, 860 P. 943 (Utah 
appellate court would not remand the case for 1993). 
an evidentiary hearing. It would be improper 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or 
agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where 
the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. 
The list should be set out on a separate page which appears immediately 
inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, with page references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with refer-
ences to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review and the standard of 
appellate review with supporting authority for each issue. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regula-
tions whose interpretation is determinative shall be set out verbatim with 
the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, 
the citation alone will suffice, and in that event, the provision shall be set 
forth as provided in paragraph (f) of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly 
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the 
court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for 
review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceed-
ings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably 
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually 
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the 
heading under which the argument is arranged 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and rea-
sons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, with citations 
to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that a statement of the 
issues or of the case need not be made unless the appellee is dissatisfied with 
the statement of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the 
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief 
in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the require-
ments of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (6), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefe 
may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their 
briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such 
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the 
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the 
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actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the 
injured person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the 
pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b), to pages of 
the reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of the evidence or 
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). 
References to exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is made to 
evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made 
to the pages of the transcript at which the evidence was identified, offered, 
and received or rejected. 
(f) Reproduction of statutes, rules, regulations, documents, etc. If de-
termination of the issues presented requires the study of statutes, rules, regu-
lations, etc., or relevant parts thereof, to the extent not set forth under sub-
paragraph (a)(6) of this rule, they shall be reproduced in the brief or in an 
addendum at the end, or they may be supplied to the court in pamphlet form. 
Copies of those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to 
the determination of the appeal (e.g., the challenged instructions, findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the contract or document 
subject to construction, etc.) shall also be included in the addendum. 
(g) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs 
shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive 
of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any adden-
dum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as re-
quired by paragraph (f) of this rule. 
(h) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the 
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the 
purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the 
court otherwise orders. The brief of the appellee shall contain the issues and 
arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of 
the appellant. 
d) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases 
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated 
for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and 
any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of 
another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An origi-
nal letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original 
letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a 
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for 
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing 
and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be con-
cise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and 
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs 
which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua 
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offend-
ing lawyer. 
(1) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and 
shall comply with Rule 27. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The brief Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
must now contain for each issue raised on ap- ment, effective October 1, 1992, added the 
peal, a statement of the applicable standard of third sentence in Subdivision (c) and made sty-
review and citation of supporting authority hstic changes in Subdivisions (a)(5) and (7). 
